The creation of a number of very large and sometimes increasingly complex financial institutions, resulting in part from the on-going consolidation of the financial system, has raised concerns that the degree of systemic risk in the financial system may have increased. We argue that firm interdependencies, as measured by correlations of stock returns, provide an indicator of systemic risk potential. We analyze the dynamics of the stock return correlations of a sample of U.S. large and complex banking organizations (LCBOs) over 1988-1999, and find a significant positive trend in stock return correlations. This finding is consistent with the view that the systemic risk potential in the financial sector appears to have increased over the last decade. In addition, we relate firms' return correlations to their consolidation activity by estimating measures of the consolidation elasticity of correlation. Increases in consolidation at the sample LCBOs appear to have contributed to increases in LCBOs interdependencies. However, consolidation elasticities of correlation exhibit substantial time variation, and likely declined in the latter part of the decade. Thus, factors other than consolidation have also been responsible for the upward trend in return correlations.
Introduction
The on-going consolidation of the financial system is one of the most notable features of the contemporary financial landscape. The resulting creation of a number of very large and in some cases increasingly complex financial institutions has raised concerns that the degree of systemic risk in the financial system may have increased.
However, as noted in the recent survey by DeBandt and Hartmann (2000) , research aimed at specifying empirical models capturing the impact of systemic risk events is quite limited. In addition, no previous work has examined the relationship between systemic risk and financial consolidation. This paper attempts to contribute toward filling both gaps.
Guided by a broad definition of systemic risk, we argue that firm interdependencies provide an indicator of systemic risk potential, and measure interdependencies with correlations of stock returns. Our analysis proceeds in two steps.
First, we analyze the dynamics of such correlations during the 1988-1999 period for a sample of U.S. large and complex banking organizations (LCBOs). With the exception of Campbell et al. (2000) , no prior study has focused on the dynamics of interdependencies at the firm level. Second, we relate firms' return correlations to their consolidation activity by estimating measures of the consolidation elasticity of correlation both crosssectionally and through time. This is a novel contribution that builds on our previous efforts. 1 We find that there was a significant positive trend in stock return correlations among the sample LCBOs during the 1990s. This finding is consistent with the view that 1 Group of Ten (2001), chapter IV. the potential for economic shocks to become agents of systemic risk in the financial sector appears to have increased over the last decade. In addition, increases in consolidation at the sample LCBOs appear to have contributed to increases in LCBO interdependencies during the sample period. However, consolidation elasticities of correlation exhibit substantial time variation, and likely declined in the latter part of the decade.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I defines systemic risk, focusing on the critical need for interdependencies between firms and the central role of the largest and most complex banking organizations. Section II presents our measure of total interdependency, and describes and interprets trends in this measure over the 1990s.
Section III describes our measure of consolidation. Section IV presents estimates of the consolidation elasticity of correlation, and the final section concludes.
I.

Defining Systemic Risk
Systemic financial risk is the risk that an event (shock) will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in, and attendant increases in uncertainty about, a substantial portion of the financial system that is large enough to, in all probability, have significant adverse effects on the real economy. 2 Two related assumptions underlie this definition. First, economic shocks may become systemic because of the existence of negative externalities associated with severe disruptions in the financial system. In particular, a negative shock at a single firm or small group of firms must be highly likely to have contagion effects on other firms. Second, systemic financial events must be highly likely to induce undesirable real effects, such as substantial reductions in output and employment. This definition is consistent with most definitions of systemic risk proposed in the literature. However, it is stricter than some because it explicitly requires that (i) the negative externalities of a systemic event extend both to agents in the financial system and to the real economy, and (ii) these externalities are highly likely to occur.
In this paper, we use the implications of the need for externalities between financial firms to obtain measures of the potential for systemic risk in the financial sector.
Specifically, we argue that for externalities to exist, firms must be interdependent in some way. Interdependencies can either be direct or indirect. Direct interdependencies arise from inter-firm on-and off-balance sheet exposures, including linkages through payment and settlement systems. Indirect interdependencies arise from correlated exposures to nonfinancial sectors and financial markets. Either way, the size of a financial institution's total interdependencies (direct plus indirect) with other financial institutions, and the quantitative strength of these interdependencies across many firms will be key determinants of whether a shock to one (or a small number of) financial institutions has the potential to become systemic. Thus, estimation of systemic risk potential may be achieved, and is discussed in detail in section II, using a measure of the interdependencies of financial institutions.
In the United States, systemic risk concerns have focused traditionally on the implications of bank deposit runs for the payments system, the money supply and financial intermediation. However, the advent of deposit insurance, an understanding of the need to maintain an adequate supply of money and money market liquidity, and the development of prudential supervision and regulation have essentially eliminated the threat of deposit runs by retail customers (primarily households and small businesses) of insured depositories. 3 Indeed, systemic deposit runs and flights to currency have not occurred in the United States since World War II. As a result, discussion of systemic risk has shifted more to consideration of issues raised at the wholesale level. 4 In practice, this means concentrating attention on the largest and most complex financial institutions.
This refocusing has been reinforced by the forces of technological change, deregulation, globalization and the increasing use of financial markets that have been driving the rapid evolution of the U.S. and global financial systems. For all of these reasons, this paper is limited to attempting to clarify the relationship between systemic risk, the largest and most complex banking organizations, and consolidation activity at such institutions.
In order to conduct empirical work, the set of financial institutions that has the potential to impose systemic risk must be defined. One approach would be merely to use some arbitrarily defined group of the very largest institutions. However, recent developments in banking supervision allow us to adopt a more refined procedure. For supervisory purposes, the set of LCBOs is fluid, and can change due to developments at either the individual firm or in the overall industry. DeFerrari and Palmer (2001) report that since the program's formal establishment in 1999, the number of LCBOs has been in the range of 25 to 30 institutions.
II.
Trends in Total Interdependencies
This section first defines our measure of total interdependency, and describes our LCBO sample in more detail. It then describes and interprets the evolution of our measure of interdependency over the sample period. Thus, a fundamental assumption of our analysis is that an observed increase in correlations among LCBO stock returns may signal an increase in the potential for a shock to become systemic. Conversely, discovery of no change or a decrease in correlations would be consistent with the view that systemic risks had not increased or even declined.
A. Definition of interdependency
For each year from 1988 through 1999, weekly percentage changes in stock prices are computed for each of the sample LCBOs. Following convention, cross-correlations of returns between pairs of firms are computed using a 52-week rolling window. 8 As reported below, these correlations are used in a variety of ways, including for computing averages across all of the sample LCBOs, and within and across their peer groups.
Because the focus of this study is on U.S. firms, a sample of U.S.-chartered andowned LCBOs is used. 9 Sample selection and data construction proceeded in two steps.
First, the 18 U.S.-chartered and -owned LCBOs in existence on December 31, 1999 were identified. Second, inspection of the sample led to the addition of four more LCBOs that did not exist at the end of 1999, because they had been acquired by one of the 18 firms in the year-end 1999 sample. However, because the acquisition of these four firms occurred not earlier than year-end 1997, and because supervisors had informally classified each as
an LCBO in 1998, we decided to, where possible, include all four firms in the sample.
Thus, for the vast majority of the sample period we evaluate 22 LCBOs.
7 Stock prices of LCBOs are end-of-Friday quotes taken from Bloomberg.
8 See Engle (2000) and Campbell et.al (2000) . Also following convention, as noted where appropriate below, the rolling window methodology is sometimes not used. It is noteworthy that the importance of the sample LCBOs has risen substantially in recent years. For example (and as described in more detail in Section III), their share of the total assets of U.S. bank holding companies and independent banks grew steadily from 34 percent in 1988 to 69 percent in 1999. In addition, because the LCBO program was only formally established in 1999, it is not possible to "officially" identify LCBOs going back into our sample period. Thus, we examine the same 22 firms over the entire sample period.
B. Trends in interdependency
Charts 1 and 2 present our first descriptions of how LCBO interdependencies evolved during the 1990s. Chart 1 plots the mean weekly rolling-window correlations between the (at most) 231 LCBO pairs from 1990 through 1999. Although there is considerable variability in the series, a substantial jump in the average correlations is evident beginning in 1996 and continuing through the rest of the decade.
The conjecture of an increase in return correlations is supported by the data summarized in Chart 2, which shows average R-squared statistics for two sets of "market model" regressions. The solid line gives the mean R-square for a two-index market model estimated for each LCBO for each week in the sample. The two indexes include the S&P 500 market index, a measure of overall market returns, and an LCBO index computed by the authors of equally weighted LCBO returns. The dashed line summarizes results using only the S&P 500 index as an independent variable. Both models show a marked increase in mean R-square beginning in 1996, suggesting that the ability of overall market conditions, including common conditions at LCBOs, to "explain" returns at individual LCBOs increased in the latter part of the 1990s. Put differently, the models suggest that returns at individual LCBOs became more vulnerable to overall market conditions in the last half of the decade.
These results also indicate that the evolution of interdependencies was quite different at our sample LCBOs than among the vast majority of other publicly traded firms. In their mammoth study of stock returns, Campbell et. al. (2000) "document the evolution of correlations among individual stocks by calculating all pairwise correlations among stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq" from 1962 through 1997, using both daily and monthly data. 
R(j,t) = a(j) +e(j,t)
Equations (1) and (2) are the return equations: R(i,t) (R(j,t)) denotes firm i (j) returns, a(i) (a(j)) denotes the unconditional mean of firm i (j) return, and e(i) (e(j)) is the innovation, or the unexpected return, of firm i (j). Innovations are assumed to be normal with mean 0 and 2x2 covariance matrix H(t). The diagonal elements of H(t) are the variances of firm i and j returns, denoted by h(i,t) and h(j,t) respectively. The off-diagonal elements of H(t), denoted by h(ij,t), are the covariances of firm i and j returns. Equations (3) and (4) are the variance equations, where we added a trend term to capture potential time variation in conditional variances. Equation (5) Overall, the results in this section strongly suggest that there was a significant positive trend in stock return correlations among the sample LCBOs during the 1990s. In addition, this trend was especially evident within and between the groups of relatively less complex financial institutions. Thus, given our maintained assumption regarding the interpretation of stock return correlations, the evidence is consistent with the view that the potential for economic shocks to become agents of systemic risk in the financial sector appears to have increased over the last decade.
III.
Trends in Consolidation
The first part of this section defines our measure of consolidation at the sample LCBOs. The second describes the evolution of this measure over the 1990s.
A. Variable definition
We define our measure of consolidation as the change in an institution's, or pair of institution's, market share. Market share is defined, in turn, by the ratio of an institution's (or pair of institution's) total assets to total assets in the U.S. banking system.
Total assets in the U.S. banking system are computed as the sum of total consolidated assets at bank holding companies plus total assets at independent banks. 13 This straightforward measure has considerable intuitive appeal, although it ignores off-balance sheet activities. However, because the primary goal is to create a variable that captures important consolidation events within the sample LCBOs, this deficiency does not appear to merit serious concern. Indeed, inspection of the data for the 22 sample LCBOs indicates that any completed major acquisition recorded by the federal banking agencies is matched by a jump at the same date in an acquirer's market share.
B. Trends in consolidation
Charts 3 
IV. Relating Interdependencies and Consolidation
We examine the relationship between LCBOs' interdependencies and consolidation by estimating measures of the elasticity of return correlations with respect to LCBO market shares. We refer to this measure as the consolidation elasticity of correlation. We begin by considering a pooled time series cross-section model estimated at annual frequency to establish an overall relationship for our sample period. However, due to the clear time variability of our results, most of our analysis is focused on crosssection regressions estimated at weekly frequency.
Our observation unit in all models is a firm-pair. In the pooled time series crosssection model, for each year in our sample we compute the correlation of returns associated with a different pair of firms. Since our sample includes at most 22 firms in each year, we compute at most 231 correlations associated with a different pair of firms in each year. The stock return correlation among a pair of firms in year t is computed using weekly stock return data of the 52 weeks preceeding the last week of year t. The market share of a firm pair is the sum of the market share of each firm in the pair at the end of year t.
Our "basic" estimating equation is:
The correlation of any firm-pair k in year t is denoted by ρ(k,t). The variable X(k,t-1) is the sum of market shares of the two firms in firm-pair k in year (t-1). Time fixed-effects are indicated by the vector α(t), which includes time dummies assuming the value of unity for year t and zero otherwise, with α′ denoting the transpose of the relevant coefficient vector. Time fixed-effects are introduced to control even at the annual level for the substantial time variation of correlations documented in section II. The lagged value of the correlation is included as an approximate control for other factors that may determine current correlation.
The coefficient β estimates the consolidation elasticity of correlation.
Specifically, it estimates the percentage change in stock return correlation associated with a lagged percentage change in the market share of a firm-pair. The specification of a lag for the consolidation variable is consistent with our assumption that consolidation may be a causal factor in the increased correlation of returns documented in section II. Table 2 presents estimates of equation (6) in which all firm-pairs are pooled (panel A) and in which we allow for different consolidation elasticities within groups and between groups (panel B). To save space, time fixed-effects coefficients are not reported.
Looking first at panel A, the estimated consolidation elasticity is 0.11 and is significantly different from zero. Thus, a 10 percent increase in firm-pair market shares implies a 1.1 percent increase in correlation. Put differently, during the 1988-1999 period an increase in consolidation is estimated to have contributed to an increase in LCBOs' interdependencies, as measured by the correlations of their stock returns.
Turning to panel B, both consolidation elasticities are significantly positive, and the fact that the estimated consolidation elasticity for between-group correlation is 0.12, whereas that estimated for within-group correlation is 0.11, suggests only a small difference in the effects of consolidation across the two groups. However, a test of the statistical significance of this difference reveals that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. Thus, between-group consolidation appears to have had a (slightly) larger positive impact on correlation (interdependency) than did consolidation within-groups. In other words, consolidation among relatively dissimilar firms has tended to have a slightly larger positive impact on correlation (interdependency) among firms' returns than has consolidation among firms with more similar degrees of complexity.
As documented in section II, time variation in correlations has been pervasive during our sample period. In addition, and as documented in section III, consolidation activity at the sample LCBOs has been intense during the period, but has proceeded in waves of different intensity for different peer groups. Depending upon the peer group, consolidation has been intense at the beginning of the period, sustained during the period, and intense in the last year of the period. The time variations in both correlations and consolidation activity raise the question of whether the impact of consolidation on correlations is time varying.
To test for time variation in the consolidation elasticity, we estimate cross-section regressions of equation (6) using the highest frequency time series data available to us--weekly data for correlations and quarterly data on market shares. Specifically, for each of the 520 weeks running from 1990.1 to 1999.52, we estimate equation (6) Chart 6 reports elasticity estimates and relevant p-values for within-group and between-group regressions in the same format as chart 5. Overall, the panels of the chart show that the time variation of within-group and between-group consolidation elasticities is very similar. However, we note two differences. First, the within-group consolidation elasticity is not significantly different from zero between the end of the 1990 and the end of 1992, whereas the between-group consolidation elasticity is frequently positive and significant during the same sub-period. Second, it is only the between-group consolidation elasticity that exhibits a strong tendency to assume a negative value during the end of the period.
On balance, the results presented in this section suggest several general conclusions. First, over the 1990s it appears that increases in consolidation at the sample LCBOs contributed to increases in LCBOs' interdependencies, increases that are both statistically and economically significant. Moreover, consolidation among relatively dissimilar firms has tended to have a slightly larger positive impact on interdependency than has consolidation among firms with more similar degrees of complexity. However, the consolidation elasticities estimated here clearly vary over time, and likely declined in the latter part of the decade.
IV. Conclusion
This study has considered two basic questions. First, has the degree of interdependency, and by implication the degree of systemic risk potential in the banking system, among a sample of large and complex banking organizations changed over the 1990s? Second, have any changes in the degree of interdependency been associated with changes in consolidation activity at the LCBOs?
With regard to the first question, the evidence is highly consistent with the view that there was a significant upward trend in the degree of interdependency, as measured by stock return correlations, among the sample LCBOs during the 1990s. This trend seems particularly evident within and between the groups of relatively less complex banking organizations. This suggests that the potential for economic shocks to become agents of systemic risk in the financial sector has likely increased over the last decade. 
B. Different within-group and between-group consolidation elasticity of correlation
Within-group Between-group Ln(ρ(k,t)) = α′α(t) + 0.105 Ln(XW(k,t-1)) + 0.118 Ln(XB(k,t-1)) + 0.169 Ln(ρ(k,t-1)) + ε(k,t) 
